Modeling the Artificial Immune System to the Human Immune System with the Use of Agents by Barrishi, Bashar
  
 
 
 
MODELING THE ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM 
TO THE HUMAN IMMUNE SYSTEM 
WITH THE USE OF AGENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
BASHAR BARRISHI 
Bachelor of Science 
Computer Science 
Mutah University 
Karak, Jordan 
1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
December 2004 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
MODELING THE ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM 
TO THE HUMAN IMMUNE SYSTEM 
WITH THE USE OF AGENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
  Thesis Approved: 
 
 
 
Blayne Mayfield 
  _____________________________________________ 
Thesis Advisor 
 
George Hedrick 
  _____________________________________________ 
 
Venkatesh Sarangan 
  _____________________________________________ 
 
A. Gordon Emslie  
  _____________________________________________ 
Dean of the Graduate College 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 I wish to express my great appreciation to my thesis advisor, Dr. Mayfield for his 
insight, intelligence, constructive guidance and support. My sincere appreciation extends 
to my committee members Dr. Hedrick and Dr. Sarangan for their guidance, assistance 
and encouragement. I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Samadzadeh for his support, 
guidance and valuable counseling. I wish to thank my friend and colleague Mr. Cain for 
his support and encouragement. 
 I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my father and mother for their 
support and blessings, you were always my inspiration. Thanks to my sister and brother 
for their support and love. 
 My special gratitude and appreciation is to my leader, role model, friend and King, 
Abdullah II Bin Al-Hussein. It was your support, trust, and inspiration that helped me 
through my achievements. My beloved King, thank you. 
 Finally, I would like to thank the department of computer science and the OSU 
library faculty, staff, and students for their support. Thanks to all my family and friends. 
To all those that I forgot to thank, I hope you will find it in your heart to forgive. 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Chapter               Page 
I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................2 
1.1 The Problem. .................................................................................................2 
1.2 Purpose of the Study. .....................................................................................4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................6 
2.1 Brief Description of the Human Immune System. ..........................................6 
2.2 Related Work on Artificial Immune Systems..................................................9 
2.3 Models of malware.......................................................................................14 
2.4 Approximation Between the Human Immune System and the Available 
Security Systems.............................................................................................19 
2.5 Related Work on Self-Healing Systems........................................................23 
2.6 Comparative Study of Self-Healing Systems. ...............................................25 
2.6.1    A Graph based (Re)configuration language....................................... 28 
2.6.2    Model-Based adaptation for self-healing systems.............................. 33 
2.6.3    The DMonA Architecture. ................................................................ 36 
2.6.4    Kinesthetics eXtreme (KX)............................................................... 39 
2.7 Bandwidth Control. ......................................................................................42 
2.8 Processes Control.........................................................................................43 
III. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................46 
3.1 Basis of the Approach. .................................................................................46 
3.2 The System’s Architecture ...........................................................................47 
3.3 Characteristics and design of the Agent. .......................................................49 
 v
3.4 Architecture workflow .................................................................................54 
IV. CONCLUSIONS.....................................................................................................58 
4.1 Summary. ....................................................................................................58 
4.2 Conclusions. ................................................................................................59 
4.3 Model Weaknesses.......................................................................................63 
REFERENCES..............................................................................................................66 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Page 
Table 1. Correlation between the HIS and the AIS [9] ...................................................11 
Table 2. Comparison Between Four Self-Healing Systems. ...........................................61 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Externalized Adaptation In A Model Based Self-Healing System [27]............33 
Figure 2. Communication Channels Between Dmona And Dips Layers. ........................37 
Figure 3. Structure of the Proposed Network Model. .....................................................48 
Figure 4. Immunity Propagation Among The Nodes. .....................................................56 
Figure 5. The Process By Which T Cells And B Cells Interact With Antigens [6]..........70 
Figure 6. Graphical Representation of the Life Cycle of T Cells and B Cells and Their 
Interactions with Antigens. ....................................................................................71 
Figure 7. Agent Structure And Flow Diagram................................................................72 
Figure 8. Sandbox Technique Sequence.........................................................................75 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In a continuous search for computer security, researchers and software developers are 
trying to provide all the possible means to stop the threat to information. These efforts 
include providing different ways to save the data, backup techniques, and security 
applications against harmful programs. 
This research discusses the use of the human (biological) immune system to provide 
the basis of a model for an artificial immune system. The research lays out a complete 
workflow for the model with the use of agents and commercial off-the-shelf products to 
work together to counter malware. The novel idea in this work is in providing a self-
healing system that is outside the software architectural descriptive handling (while 
avoiding the weaknesses of the current models); which utilizes the achievements of the 
market security products to provide a complete self-healing package from malware in a 
controlled environment. 
This research provides the ground for a complete implementation of a product which 
can handle programs considered untrustworthy. The agent uses techniques such as 
sandboxing, processing priority and bandwidth control to quarantine the malicious code 
and prevent it from spreading. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem. 
Malicious software (malware) has been a threat to organizations and personal 
machines since the first written computer program. In fact, any program not debugged 
correctly may cause a problem of some kind or undesirable result. This code, if executed 
in such a context, will have an unacceptable output. A common definition among the 
security community of malware is: “Short for malicious software, which is designed 
specifically to damage or to disrupt a system, such as a virus or a Trojan horse” [15]. This 
definition is debated all over the security research community, even when it is used by 
the community members; where it lacks complete definition. If someone writes code that 
overwrites a part of the bootable hard drive in a silent way (i.e. without informing the 
user of the running process), that code is not malware for the writer, because he1 knows 
the complete functionality of the code, he might be using it to fix a problem. If someone 
other than the code writer gets a copy of that code and executes it without knowing all of 
its functionality, then according to the definition above, this code could be considered 
malware because it damaged and disrupted the system. 
The goal of this study is to present an architecture for a security system that provides 
a self-healing capability with minimal user interference. The significance is that such an 
architecture will provide the system the capability to identify malware based on its 
characteristics and behavior. This prevention results in saving time and money. 
                                               
1
 Whenever “He” is used in the text, it means “He/She.” 
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A complete and precise definition of malware is difficult to find; due to the changing 
nature of such code. This research focuses on the hidden functionality of the malware, 
defining it as a piece of code (single program or an application) that performs an 
undesirable action without the user’s knowledge or without the user’s knowledge of all 
its actions. 
This definition helps to describe the code functionality in this approach, which 
includes viruses, worms and the like. Our concern also includes malware that activates 
without the user’s knowledge or acceptance, such as spyware. The result of running such 
applications may be destructive or a mere violation of privacy. 
The easy access and wide usage of the Internet make it a prime target for malicious 
activity. In particular, the Internet has become a powerful mechanism for propagating 
malicious software programs designed to annoy (e.g., deface web pages), spread 
misinformation (e.g., false news reports or stock quotes), deny service (e.g., corrupt hard 
disks), steal financial information (e.g. credit card numbers), and enable remote login 
(e.g., Trojan horses). The two most popular ways to spread such malicious software are 
commonly referred to as worms (such as Code Red) and email viruses (such as Melissa or 
Love Bug). However, it is increasingly difficult to categorize malicious software 
programs using these terms [11]. 
Mapping an artificial model to a biological model is a helpful method used in the 
study of evolutionary computation. Approaches such as Artificial Life study biological 
life to achieve optimization, just as ant colonies are studied to find different approaches 
to problems like the Traveling Salesman problem. With this in mind, researchers began 
looking for a biological model to help in achieving better security. Researchers used the 
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Human Immune System (HIS) as the biological model, which is the same model in all the 
vertebrates, due to its complexity and its familiar functionality. The HIS model can help 
us better understand the biological approach for handling an antigen attack, and in trying 
to develop a solution in the artificial system similar to the biological process to handle 
security threats. 
Building components that approximate the behavior of the human immune system 
components to encounter malware without depending on the user interference may 
provide an enhanced self-healing capability. This paper proposes a self-healing 
architecture based on the HIS model with the use of agents to protect the system from 
malware threats. The agents coordinate the actions and behaviors of the security 
components, perform anomaly detection, identify unknown malware and make/suggest 
decisions by communicating with the administrator, here, the administrator intervention 
is welcomed, but not necessary. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study. 
 The purpose of the study is to provide a working model of a self-healing system that 
helps in preventing from malware threats, inspired by the human immune system 
working architecture, which proved to be effective in handling antigens unknown to the 
system. The components of the model are mostly commercial off-the-shelf, except for the 
agent that manages these components and coordinates their behavior once the agent 
detects an anomaly in the system. 
 In researching a security self-healing system that models the HIS, accuracy in the 
behavior model is required to design future adaptation or modification if needed, based 
on the original model. For an example, the HIS does not behave in an intelligent manner 
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during the detection or the cleaning phases. Therefore, the Artificial Immune System 
(AIS) follows a step-by-step sequence in detecting and cleaning antigens, based on trial 
and error, depending on the information that it gets from its previous experiences, which 
is logged in a database for future use. Meanwhile, the components may behave 
intelligently based on their duties and functionalities, depending on the provider’s design 
of the product. 
 The AIS will behave in a natural manner by quarantining the infected node from the 
rest of the network to avoid spread of the “disease”, by utilizing strict firewall policies. 
Alongside the prevention of antigen spread, it is required to protect the system from the 
external threats and perpetrators awaiting the necessary conditions to perform harmful 
actions.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Brief Description of the Human Immune System. 
 The human immune system is extremely complex. Some believe it has evolved over 
hundreds of millions of years to respond to invasion of the pathogenic microbes that 
regularly attempt to infect our bodies and the invasion of the microbes that tried to infect 
our genetic ancestors. There are similarities between the immune system of humans and 
those of the most primitive of vertebrates [6], with the difference in the complexity and 
nature of the threats they may encounter in their environments.  
Diseases in the body are recognized by symptoms that occur as the result of a 
weakened immune system not being able to produce sufficient antibodies to counter a 
particular strain of virus, bacteria or fungus. The symptoms could be pain, swelling, 
infected wounds, poor digestion, stiff joints, weakened bones or general debilitation.  
The immune system does not rely on one single mechanism to deter invaders, but 
instead uses many strategies, the most important of which are detailed below. The main 
division between the strategies is that between innate immunity, which does not require 
previous exposure to the invading microbe, and acquired immunity, whereby the immune 
system "remembers" how to deal with a microbe that it has dealt with before [1].  
Phagocytes (white blood cells) are the soldiers of the immune system, and provide 
innate immunity. They are responsible for swallowing, killing and digesting invading 
microbes. The process of swallowing microbes is known as phagocytosis. There are two 
main types of phagocyte: 
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- Microphages. These cells are also known as Polymorphonuclear Leucocytes, 
PMNs and Polymorphs. These cells start life in the bone marrow. They are 
constantly circulating in the blood. They cannot replicate, and live for only a few 
days. The bone marrow contains large reserves of microphages.  
- Macrophages. These cells start out life as monocytes, which originate in the stem 
cells in the bone marrow, but when they are first called into action, they turn into 
macrophages. Macrophages are not as numerous as microphages, and there are no 
large reserves of them, but they are longer lived than microphages. Macrophages 
are stationed at strategic locations throughout the body, usually in places that are 
not otherwise well defended. These areas include the alveoli of the lungs, the 
abdominal (peritoneal) and chest (pleural) cavities, under the top layer of the skin 
and the intestines. Macrophages are the front line of defense against microbial 
invasion in these areas.  
Macrophages engulf antigens, process them internally, and then display parts of them 
on their surface together with some of their own proteins. This sensitizes the T cells to 
recognize these antigens. All cells are coated with various substances. Clusters of 
Differentiation (CD) encompass more than one hundred and sixty clusters, each of which 
is a different chemical molecule that coats the surface. 
An immunocompetent but as yet immature B-lymphocyte is stimulated to maturity 
when an antigen binds to its surface receptors and there is a T helper cell nearby (to 
release a cytokine). This sensitizes or primes the B cell and it undergoes clonal selection 
(Appendix A1), which means it reproduces asexually by mitosis. Most of the family of 
clones becomes plasma cells. These cells, after an initial lag, produce highly specific 
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antibodies at a rate of as many as 2000 molecules per second for four to five days. The 
other B cells become long-lived memory cells. (Appendix ‘A’ describes the interaction 
between the T-cells, B-cells and the antigens [6]). 
When these tasks are complete, the Macrophages have one further task to complete. 
They return to the lymph nodes, displaying the remnants of the destroyed invader on their 
surface. This has the effect of stimulating the cells of the acquired immunity system into 
action. 
Immunity can be either natural or artificial, innate or acquired/adaptive, and either 
active or passive.  
- Active natural (contact with infection): develops slowly, is long term, and 
antigen-specific.  
- Active artificial (immunization): develops slowly, lasts for several years, and is 
specific to the antigen for which the immunization was given.  
- Passive natural (transplacental, i.e. mother to child): develops immediately, is 
temporary, and affects all antigens to which the mother has immunity.  
- Passive artificial (injection of gamma globulin): develops immediately, is 
temporary, and affects all antigens to which the donor has immunity.  
The goal of all vaccines is to promote a primary immune reaction so that when the 
organism is again exposed to the antigen, a much stronger secondary immune response 
will be elicited. Any subsequent immune response to an antigen is called a secondary 
response and it has the following properties: 
- Shorter lag time,  
- More rapid buildup,  
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- Higher overall level of response,  
- More specific or better "fit" to the invading antigen. 
In summary, the following innate immunity will be the model for the digitized 
immune system. It is comprised of a collection of proteins that "recognize" corresponding 
proteins on the cell walls of invading microbes. When such invading microbes have been 
recognized, the following actions are taken: 
- The "alarm" is sounded. Chemicals, known as chemotaxins, that attract 
phagocytes are emitted. This process is known as chemotaxis. The phagocytes 
follow the trail of chemotaxins to arrive at the site of invasion.  
- The invading bacteria are "marked" with chemicals that make them stand out. 
These chemicals are known as opsonins, from the Latin word opsonium, meaning 
"sauce". This "marking" greatly increases the chances of the invading bacteria 
being phagocytosed.  
2.2 Related Work on Artificial Immune Systems. 
Zhang et al. [16] discuss an immunity-based model for network intrusion detection, 
which could be looked at as the simplest way of applying the Human Immune System 
(HIS) model on a computer world. The simplicity lies in the fact that these immunity 
agents will have steady and fixed targets on which to focus, which are the incoming ports 
and the packets being transferred. The paper focuses on certain aspects of the HIS such as 
the threshold of the number of detected antigens to provide activation for killer cells, also 
the memory model to attack the already known antigens. The paper describes the 
characteristics of the Intrusion Detection (ID) system as distributed, self-organized and 
lightweight. It also discusses and identifies the nature of self versus alien connection in 
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correlation to trusted and not-trusted transactions. The task is performed through two 
processes, the detector generation, and the detection process. The detectors are generated 
randomly and considered immature at this stage. If the detector produces false positives 
during the training period, it will be eliminated. The detectors use the pattern matching to 
provide detection of non-self transactions, which are generated outside the 
network/organization entity. However, the process in which the generation of the 
detectors is being used was not well documented because it describes the propagation of 
the characteristics to newly generated detectors without defining the mechanism for 
achieving such a goal. In the paper it seems that there is a trivial way of generating a 
detector, training and testing it albeit sometimes immaturely. However, if a detector fails 
it will be eliminated, with very little use of its good characteristics. 
In Robert et al. [12], the paper discusses a distributed architecture for virus detection, 
which should ease the processing pressure (detection and job execution) of the individual 
nodes. This is achieved by protecting the node from infection and assigning the tasks 
allocated to the infected node to other nodes for execution. It also introduces the concept 
of self (files generated within the system) or non-self (files from an external source) 
identification methods presented in [5] to identify individual files posing threats, or 
infected files. Some self-files might mutate to non-self by being infected. Another 
approach described in the paper is the use of virus decoy programs to attract viruses to 
infect them. Once the file is being infected, the virus signature is extracted and 
monitored. 
The authors also describe a leveled approach to the problem: local, network and 
global. Each level has its responsibilities and functionalities. In the local level decoys 
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used to attract the attackers are deployed (entrapment) and identification is performed on 
the antigen. Every attack or malware characteristic is added to the knowledge base for 
future reference. The network area performs the classification and reporting, while the 
global level performs the strategy management and selection of decoys based on an 
evolutionary algorithm approach, in which the fitness function is based on the attracting 
characteristics of the decoy and its success. 
Regina et al. [9] present an excellent approximation between the HIS and the 
Artificial Immune System (AIS). The study discusses innate and acquired immunity, the 
stages of a disease, and the countermeasures that are taken to eliminate the threat. In their 
correlation the authors discuss four main aspects that both systems have to monitor: 
availability, correction, integrity and accountability. Table (1) displays the correlation 
and their duties. 
 
 Human Immune System Artificial Immune System 
Integrity  This is a way to guarantee that 
the genetic codes present in the 
cells will not be corrupted by 
any pathogen 
Data has to be protected from 
intentional or accidental corruption 
Availability This aspect allows the body to 
continue working even under 
attack of a pathogen 
Information, such as the computer, 
must be accessible when necessary 
and as desired 
Correction This mechanism prevents the 
immune system against attacks 
of the (body) cells 
False alarms from an incorrect 
classification of computational 
events must be minimized 
Accountability These are means adopted by the 
immune system to identify, find 
and destroy the pathological 
agents 
The security system must be 
configured to preserve sufficient 
information from the intrusion that 
can be permitted to trace the origin 
of the attack 
Confidentiality 
 
There are no concepts of secret 
data or confidential information 
Data access must only be allowed 
to authorized users 
 
Table 1. Correlation between the HIS and the AIS [9] 
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The main threat the paper discusses is the intrusion into the system. The tools 
described to detect the threat are: (1) misuse intrusion, where well-defined attacks are 
launched against known system vulnerability, and (2) anomaly intrusions, which can be 
identified as activities based on deviation from normal system usage patterns. The paper 
classifies four possible scenarios that the system might encounter, checked against four 
log files: Hacking, violations, violations-ignore, and ignore. The hacking log file would 
be composed of keywords that characterize a hacking attempt. If detected, the immune 
system is activated. The violations log file is composed of keywords that characterize a 
violation. If detected, protective actions are required, i.e., blocking certain ports. The 
violations-ignore log file contains keywords opposite of the violations log check. Activity 
is logged and no action is required. The ignore log file holds keywords that are safe for 
the user. The paper displays experimental results of improved numbers of true positive 
detection and lesser numbers of false positives, compared to previously used signature 
approaches. 
Neil et al. [10] describe JISYS system, which is AIS for network security. The main 
activities of the system are to collect information about the data transferred and 
categorize it as self (initialization). Performing this frequently “generalizes” on these data 
sets to identify non-self. Over time it mutates to apprehend new changes (accepted ones), 
to generate new patterns and generations, then to generalize on the new data again. The 
process will repeat for all the data sets. This process continues to produce AIS to 
recognize any data sets that are not legitimate to traffic the network. 
The drawback of the system as described by the authors is the extensive execution 
time that the system takes [The complexity of the algorithm is O(n2) in the worst case], 
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due to the need for processing the data transferred and then matching it with the library 
and mutating if required. The system was developed to identify fraud in audited data, but 
it is generalized to monitor network traffic as well. 
Taheri et al. [14] introduce two approaches to utilize agent federation for error 
control by imitating the HIS. Agent federation is a process of generating numerous 
numbers of agents with different characteristics abstracted from a knowledgebase. The 
approaches discussed are the immune recruitment mechanism (IRM) and the genetic 
algorithms (GA). With IRM, the antibodies are selected from a pool randomly. These 
agents work to locate and handle. The agents are called to counter the antigen once it is 
located. The federation of agents chooses the individual with the best capabilities to 
achieve the required task. If it succeeds then it will be cloned and will spread to destroy 
the remaining antigen. If no individual from the initial set possesses the required 
capability then all the initial set will be terminated and a new population will be 
generated. The process of selection is repeated until a successful clone is found. Once a 
clone is selected and the cleansing is completed then the characteristics of that clone are 
saved in a memory location for future reference and its capabilities will be within the 
potentially cloned agents (phase space theory). 
The GA approach is based on fitness, mutation and regeneration. Where an initial 
population is generated, the fitness function (based on the type of threat) selects the best 
fit members of the population. This is a basic operation in genetic algorithm, which 
selects the best members of a group based on certain criteria. The desirable characters in 
these members are forwarded to the next generation and so on until a certain number of 
iterations are performed or the desired set of characters is met (desired set of genes in the 
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chromosome). The process is repeated as it checks for the fitness until the near optimum 
is reached or a mutation is applied to certain members. In a search for the near optimum 
individual, that will be used to achieve the required cleansing of the antigen by 
reproducing the fittest members. After a successful encounter, the system activates a 
process of recording the gene “chromosome” in memory to be generated in the future in 
case a similar threat occurs. 
Other researches (i.e. [38], [39], [40]) discuss the approximation between the HIS and 
the AIS by tackling certain aspects of both systems, but none has approached the use of 
available security tools (either COTS or customized) or the use of agents to orchestrate 
their work to achieve the required immunity. 
2.3 Models of malware. 
The main threat of malware comes from the intentions of its creator; some code might 
be created to be a joke while others target core information to delete or encrypt. 
Regardless of the intentions or hidden goals, the best thing for the administrator is to 
monitor all applications, as it is his right of knowing what is happening on his machine, 
and his privileges of privacy. 
According to the institute of certified security associates (ICSA) labs 7th annual 
prevalence survey in 2001, conducted on a group of 300 organizations had 1,182,634 
encounters on 666,327 machines during the 20 months of the survey period from January 
2000 through August 2001. This translates to 113 encounters per 1,000 machines per 
month over the entire survey period. Global infection rates calculated from the surveys of 
1996 through 2001 showed a significant annual growth rate of approximately 20 
encounters per month per 1,000 PCs for each year in that period. In 2000, 36% of those 
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reporting disasters estimated that servers were down one hour or less. By contrast, 65% 
of the year 2001 respondents reported downtime of one hour or less, with 53% claiming 
no server downtime at all. More than 80% of those reporting a disaster required 20 
persons-days or less to recover from their virus disasters. The median response was four 
person-days for recovery. On average, this cost between $5,500 (median) and $69,000 
(average) in estimated direct costs [17]. 
Based on its target, malware can be classified in many categories. Here is an 
explanation of some of its types and characteristics [4]: 
1. Virus: Code that attaches itself to other software, such as a patch algorithm, by 
redirecting the original starting point of the host to the start point of the virus, or by 
residing on the machine and pointing certain hosts to point-execute the virus when 
activated. Replicates and attempts to attach itself to other applications. Effect varies 
from humorous to catastrophic. Might attack boot sector in Microsoft operating 
systems, Terminate and Stay Resident (TSR) in the memory (until certain conditions 
hold). Also, might attack applications, or network protocols. Meanwhile, in Unix, the 
threats of malware are a little different, and will be discussed later in this section. 
Certain viruses mutate or use stealth techniques to escape Antivirus (AV) software. 
They may attack any platform, though most of them are platform dependent. 
Prevention can be achieved by limiting connectivity to other machines. Movement of 
host means a spread of the virus, where the host could be a file or a mobile machine 
such as a laptop with wireless capability. Common symptoms could be physically 
monitored, such as files expanding, date/time stamps changing, slow computer due to 
the virus using the resources to multiply, or system failure. Common 
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countermeasures include identification/ containment/ recover (if possible) of the host, 
using AV software. 
2. Worm: A stand alone application that prefers network environments, often designed 
to propagate through networks, generally targeting multitasking machines with open 
network standard. Infected systems perform slower than usual and might fail. 
Monitored connectivity is a very good tool for prevention. Identification, 
containment and system recover is the countermeasure with use of AV software. 
3. Trojan Horse: Might be a virus or a worm. Main target is to gain the user’s 
cooperation by mocking a useful program to get access to certain information. Then, 
the Trojan relays the targeted information back to perpetrator. The best prevention is 
knowledge and training for users. Trojans are executed by the user, and may not 
reproduce, but they may target a specific machine or group of users. They may stay 
idle for a long time waiting for execution of the program, so users must be alerted not 
to execute it and take evasive actions if possible. 
4. Time/Logic Bomb: A virus or a worm that activates according to certain time-
stamp/conditions. They mostly try to cause damage by spreading and multiplying as 
much as possible. These take time to deploy, so careful monitoring will allow 
detection before the trigger. Team effort and user awareness are important prevention 
and detection tools, and user’s concerns should be noticed. Contain, identify and 
recover are countermeasures with use of AV to help assure cleansing. 
5. Rabbits: These target multi-tasking systems, draining the system resources by 
multiplying until complete system failure occurs. They act like worms on all machine 
levels consuming CPU, network, disk and memory resources. Firewalls play a major 
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role in prevention besides anomaly identifiers. Initial symptoms are the same as 
viruses, with increasing slowness to total paralysis.  
6. Back Doors and OS vulnerabilities: Some programmers leave an open door in the 
applications that they write to allow debugging space and direct access points. These 
might be exploited by hackers or perpetrators to gain access or to perform other 
actions they may desire. Nothing is perfect, including the operating systems (OS). 
Every now and then patches are sent to fix certain problems and vulnerabilities in the 
OS. These fixes are not always forced on the user’s machine. Therefore, some users 
might take more time before applying it to their machines. The actual declaration of 
the fix is an announcement of a problem, and certain perpetrators might use such a 
bug to attack the users who have not yet applied the fix. Users should be notified of 
any new updates and of the importance of applying these fixes. When applications 
are released, backdoors should be sealed. If there is a severe need to leave the back 
door in the released version, it should be protected and the administrator should be 
alarmed when it is used.  
7. Spyware: These are applications that are installed on the machine with the user’s 
approval (in most cases). However the spyware might do more than what was 
advertised, such as telling the weather forecast while reporting surfing behavior or 
information about the system. The important violation here is the privacy of the user 
and his right to know the behavior of the application, which it should not do such 
actions without the user’s approval. Certain applications might have been installed 
legitimately with the user’s consent, but the applications have the hidden 
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functionality of serving a third party, such as reporting other software activity on the 
machine (i.e. monitoring licensing). 
8. UNIX malware: UNIX shell scripting malware is considered one of the major 
weaknesses in the UNIX/Linux environment; it may control program configuration 
and start/kill services. Bourne (sh), Bourne Again (Bash), Korn, C and Tops C shell 
scripting could be used as interpreters, or a completely new shell script could be 
created with a simple tempting name like “runme.sh”[18]. Creating malware using 
shell scripting is relatively easy. Simple viruses may be very short, consisting of only 
a few lines, and even less code is needed to construct a Trojan. Another threat in the 
UNIX/Linux environment is the mobile code “Javascript” that uses the Java virtual 
machine, which is used in both Windows and UNIX operating systems. This means 
that mobile malware could be executed on both machines, albeit having the virtual 
machine enabled. Windows emulators are also a possible drive for malware designed 
to operate on Windows, hence the availability of the emulator will provide the proper 
grounds for these malware to execute. To be fair with UNIX, it does not have the 
volume of attack that MS Windows has due to its levels of security, but it is still not 
considered immune. 
9. Macintosh malware: Because Macintosh OS X is shipped with all its vulnerable 
services turned off and because Apple has a small market share, little opportunity is 
provided to spreading threats and malware in the Macintosh community. Experts say 
that this doesn’t mean Macintoshes are safe, but that it is very difficult to activate a 
virus. No application is allowed to launch any script without the user’s approval. 
Another plus for Macintosh is the UNIX based system that can handle multiple users 
 19 
on the same machine, preventing infection from spreading from one account/user to 
another on the same machine. In the Macintosh environment, the most frequent way 
to infect a machine is to convince the user to willingly activate a script or set his 
machine to automatically activate scripts in email messages, or by running certain 
applications in Windows emulator. Infection alternatives are definitely available, but 
“black hats” (hackers and the like), did not have the interest in the target, yet! 
In conclusion, a malware writer can persuade a victim that the code is doing 
something desirable, and the user will launch it. The writer can also bypass the victim by 
writing a self-propelled code that executes without the direct action from the user, 
depending on the settings of the operating system’s security features. 
These malware can pose a threat in one way or another to the user. Yet we have not 
discussed evolving programs that might attack in many shapes where they learn to 
change strategy and attack in many shapes to achieve a certain goal. Currently, this is not 
a wide spread threat and available technologies do not provide enough flexibility and 
speed to achieve such goals. These applications have neural network engines that provide 
alternating patterns of attack, creating either a virus or a worm, but evolving as a 
complete application, mutating in different shapes and techniques. [10]. 
2.4 Approximation Between the Human Immune System and the Available Security 
Systems. 
 
When the first worm was released in 1988, available antivirus software at that time 
could not see it because it was a standalone application which multiplied and spread 
while the antivirus expected an embedded code. Therefore it slipped through and caused 
loss in tens of millions of dollars. The threat of the unknown next step currently stands. 
 20 
The recurrently spreading technique for malware nowadays uses email attachments 
containing Worms or Trojan Horses. Mutating applications might be the new threat that 
combines various malware techniques, which might not be detected by the current 
counter measure applications. This situation dictates the daily continuing race between 
malware producers and Counter Measures (CM) developers. The CM applications are 
required to be competent to provide the required security and confidence to deliver peace 
of mind to the administrators. These applications require certification and updates to keep 
them effective against known threats. Following are some common known commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) tools for detecting and handling malware: 
- Intrusion Detection (ID): Detects inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity 
[16]. ID systems that operate on a host to detect malicious activity on that host are 
called host-based ID systems, and ID systems that operate on network data flows are 
called network-based ID systems. The basic approaches in ID are using statistical 
anomaly or pattern matching. External threats are mostly monitored and identified 
using ID, but certain applications may produce huge numbers of false positives. 
- Firewalls: A firewall is a system or group of systems that enforces an access control 
policy between two networks. The actual means by which this is accomplished varies 
widely, but in principle the firewall can be thought of as a pair of mechanisms: one 
which exists to block traffic, and the other which exists to permit traffic. Some 
firewalls place a greater emphasis on blocking traffic, while others emphasize 
permitting traffic. Probably the most important thing to recognize about a firewall is 
that it implements an access control policy defined by the administrator. Simply put, 
policies are everything the firewall can follow. 
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- Anti-Viruses (AV): Programs used to detect and remove computer viruses by 
identifying their signature (i.e. binary pattern). The simplest kind of AV scans 
executable files and boot blocks for a list of known viruses. Others are constantly 
active, attempting to detect the actions of general classes of viruses. Antivirus 
software should always include a regular update service allowing it to keep up with 
the latest viruses as they are released. 
- Behavior Monitors/Blockers [2]: Behavior blockers watch ActiveX, Java applets, 
various scripting languages, and other mobile code that arrives on a host via e-mail, 
the Internet, or other network connections. Some blockers isolate this code in a 
“sandbox,” restricting the code’s access to various OS resources and applications. 
Other blockers insert themselves into the kernel of a host’s OS to intercept system 
calls. 
As mentioned before, the Human Immune System (HIS) has its tools to counter the 
threats arising from various sources. We can describe the Artificial Immune System 
(AIS) in the same manner, where both systems seek the following four properties: 
detection, diversity, learning and tolerance: 
o Detection – Detection (or recognition) of chemical components between pathogen 
fragments and receptors on the surface of the lymphocyte occurs in a human 
immune system. 
• In the same manner, the AIS seeks the detection of any virus or harmful code that 
enters the system illegally, intends to cause damage, existing on the system 
without acquiring the user’s approval or acceptance.  
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o Diversity – Detection in the immune system is related to non-self elements of the 
organism. Thus, the immune system must have diverse receptors to ensure that at 
least some lymphocytes will react to the pathogenic element. The solution 
adopted by the body relies on a dynamic protection via a continuous renewal of 
lymphocytes. 
• The AIS has the same concept, with diverse tasks and frontiers, such as when ID 
handles the communication ports and the agent sandbox mobile code. The 
diversity of the threats that the AIS can handle provides protection from different 
sources at the same time. Hence, each element manages a different aspect of the 
system, handling a huge number of threats.  
o Learning – The immune system must be capable of detecting as quickly as 
possible the pathogen and eliminating it. It includes a principle which allows 
lymphocytes to recognize and adapt themselves to specific foreign protein 
structures, and to “remember” these structures as soon as possible when needed. 
These principles are implemented by the B cells. 
• The only task that the AIS lacks is the self (adaptive) learning, where most of the 
COTS products require continuous updates with patches from the producers to 
update them with current and new threats. The papers reviewed in the literature 
research discuss many ways to achieve the adaptability to new threats. This 
research discusses ways to achieve this goal with the use of agents. 
o Tolerance – The molecules that mark a cell as a self gene are contained in the 
chromosome sections also known as Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC). 
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• The AIS has to be tolerant with self “programs” to avoid destroying them while it 
has to be decisive with any alien code. It is important to have some kind of 
rollback or backup sequence to correct any errors that may occur during that 
process. It also needs to be able to fix self “programs” if infected. 
As we can see, both immune and computer security systems share common security 
concerns. They both intend to protect their corresponding systems against attacks and 
intrusions that cause anomalies in the system.  
2.5 Related Work on Self-Healing Systems. 
 Self-healing systems technology is a gray zone between self-adaptability, software 
engineering, software architecture and object oriented programming. In a system, the 
mechanical parts can be configured to perform self-healing by providing an array of 
redundant resources (e.g. array of hard disks), and if one of the operable HDD fails, 
another is loaded by the backup copy and operated instead. 
 To achieve the self-healing aspect in a system, there should be an automated 
mechanism to allow the system to get back online or back to full capacity without the 
involvement of the operator. Before the use of object-oriented programming, the system 
architecture was only available to the administrators to terminate or initiate a process 
manually; a failure of a function (i.e. having a bug in the code) resulted in the failure of 
the whole system, unless the administrator interfered. Furthermore, the systems were not 
built in module architecture, where processes could be altered in a single command but 
not applications, which required a set of operations to achieve replacement, termination 
or initiation. If the system failed, it required to be taken offline and rebooted to reload a 
fresh (good) copy of the system to return it to operation. This process is very time 
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consuming, considering slow machines, and the massive number of peripherals attached 
to the system. However, a system composed of multiple components means that once a 
component fails, then that component can be replaced with a corrected one. These 
components are not necessarily sitting idle, waiting to be swapped. 
 As a matter of fact, the components that are the most heavily used are the ones that 
are quicker to develop bugs. To be able to switch these heavily used components, the hot-
swapping concept is introduced. It provides an approach to load the fresh copy of the 
component in the workspace, and then delete all the pointers from the old copy and point 
them to the new one. If successful, then the old copy is removed, and the new copy is 
adopted; the system is back to normal. 
 To achieve this, the application should have the self-awareness to realize that there is 
a problem and adapt to the changing requirements. Software engineering has to consider 
the design and architecture of the components to make it easy to swap the component 
without halting a huge number of the system components. 
 Neil et al. [19] describe the essentials for the ability to dynamically repair a system 
based on its architecture at runtime. These are: 
1. Descriptive knowledge of the current architecture; 
2. Ability to express the change of the architecture; 
3. Analysis of the repair expectation and its validity; and 
4. Ability to execute the repair in runtime. 
 Software architecture description language (ADL) can describe the changes in the 
architecture of the system and provide an analysis of the suggested changes that could be 
applied as a fix. Component sensors, such as bandwidth or cycle time, can be used to 
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describe the health of the system. Reconfiguration strategy should be considered to 
provide the alternative solutions. 
 In software frameworks, approaches for software self-awareness and self-healing are 
a growing demand in languages structure and design. Open object request broker (ORB) 
provides reflection capability of middleware which, in part, provides more knowledge of 
the system structure and behavior [20]. This is being applied with the use of common 
object request broker architecture (CORBA) interceptors and dynamic proxies in Java. 
Providing a component framework can help in managing the system with a better 
understanding of the overall state. Implementation of the open ORB provides monitors 
for events and quality of service, which directs the controllers that govern the strategy 
selectors and implementers to a better solution. 
2.6 Comparative Study of Self-Healing Systems. 
Systems are increasingly required to work continuously. The idea of taking a system 
off-line to perform either hardware or software maintenance is becoming impractical 
financially and professionally. Online hardware component switching and swapping is a 
solution for hardware malfunction. Mapping this hardware concept to software 
components provides a parallel work paradigm for software malfunction runtime 
maintenance. 
User’s requirements and system resources change frequently. To provide the desired 
quality of service and continuity of that service, a cost effective technique is required to 
reliably and dynamically adapt a system’s behavior to provide optimal service. 
The work on software adaptability is not a new topic. Runtime assertion checking and 
exceptions handling are simple examples of software adaptability, but these handling 
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techniques are not capable of determining the source of the problem, and are not able to 
decide proper strategy handling for future errors. 
Software engineering has proposed many alternatives and techniques to handle 
changing software environments. Research and study has been done in that field to 
present the performance model as the monitoring element and strategy evaluation tool. 
The basic concept in these studies focuses on the architecture models as the cornerstone 
of model-based adaptation. Oreizy et al. use a hierarchical publish-subscribe service via 
C2, where all communications among components occur via connectors, thus minimizing 
component interdependencies and strictly separating computation from communication. 
The style also imposes topological constraints; every component has a “top” and a 
“bottom” side, with a single communication port on each side. This restriction greatly 
simplifies the task of adding, removing, or reconnecting a component. A C2 connector 
also has a top and a bottom, but the number of communication ports is determined by the 
components attached to it. A connector can accommodate any number of components or 
other connectors. This enables C2 connectors to accommodate runtime rebinding. 
Finally, all communications among components are done asynchronously by exchanging 
messages through connectors [21]. 
An older study by Gorlick et al. uses data-flow style via Weaves. Weaves are 
networks of concurrently executing tool fragments that communicate by passing objects. 
Weaves are distinguished from other data flow styles by their emphasis on 
instrumentation, continuous observability, and dynamic rearrangement. Basic low-
overhead instrumentation is inserted automatically. Weaves can be executed at any time 
by means of sophisticated analysis agents, without degrading the performance of the 
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weave. Weaves can be dynamically snipped and spliced without interrupting the data 
flow; this permits novel forms of experimentation and analysis. Weaves execute 
efficiently on a broad spectrum of architectures and offer numerous opportunities for 
parallel execution [22]. 
Magee et al. use bi-directional communication links via Darwin, an architectural 
description language specifically designed for the specification and construction of 
distributed software systems. It deliberately separates the description of structure from 
that of computation and interaction in order to provide a clear separation of concerns. A 
Darwin architecture can be used to compose component implementations to build a 
system and/or to compose LTS (labeled transition systems) specifications of component 
behavior for system property analysis [23]. 
Wermelinger and Fiadeiro use architecture primitives to effect architectural changes, 
independent of particular styles, mainly by using graph transformation approach for 
software reconfiguration. Their work provides a formally based language that integrates 
the aspects of architectural description, constraints, and modification [24]. 
Using architecture modeling to achieve adaptability is the preferred approach to 
address this issue. In the previous papers, the architecture model is used in different 
ways. Those research studies are relatively old, and have been used by other researchers 
to build upon. The first of these approaches that this paper discusses is the graph 
transformation approach; it is a relatively new concept that is being approached, and there 
is no further research that extends it yet. The other work discussed afterwards is built on 
architectural models, but each uses a different technique in monitoring and applying the 
changes. 
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2.6.1    A Graph based (Re)configuration language. 
 Wermelinger and Fiadeiro [26] introduced in the Software Engineering 
ESEC/FSE’99 an algebraic software architecture reconfiguration approach [25], both 
heterogeneous and uniform. It is heterogeneous because it provides a dedicated, 
separate sub-language for each aspect: a program design language for computation, a 
declarative language for constraints, and an operational language for reconfiguration. 
It is uniform because it uses Category Theory as a semantic foundation both for 
configurations taken as categorical diagrams and reconfiguration achieved through 
algebraic graph rewriting techniques. 
 The approach also provides a strict separation between computation and 
(re)configuration, while keeping them explicitly related; the components do not have 
access nor can they change the configuration variables or call scripts. The 
reconfiguration scripts have access but cannot change the state of components. Notice 
that replacing a component by another one of the same design with a different state is 
not what is meant by state change, because there are actually two components 
involved. The original one is removed and a new one is created. 
The main goal of the language is to provide high-level constructs that are suited to 
the architectural level of description of a system. In particular, interactions are created 
and removed at the level of connectors, hence guaranteeing that configurations are 
always instances of the architecture [26]. 
In the literature, the authors discuss four elements that should be monitored and 
handled within a healing system design. These are: modification time and source, 
modification operation, modification constraints, and system state. To handle all these 
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issues, a complete knowledge of the system state is required and a tool is needed to 
express this knowledge. A graph design of the system nodes and connections could 
provide expressional means of the correlations between the components. The authors 
use CommUnity programs to provide the syntactic layout of the architecture. 
CommUnity is independent of the actual data types used with pre-defined sorts and 
functions given by a fixed algebraic signature in the usual sense.  
A CommUnity design consists of a set of type defined variables and a set of 
actions. There are input, output and private variables. Input variables are read-only. 
Output and private variables are called local variables and cannot be changed by the 
environment. A design with input variables is open in the sense that it needs to be 
connected to other components of the system to read data. 
Connecting a design D1 with a design D2 is done through a channel: a set of 
bindings i1,j -i2,j , where each i1,j is a non-private variable or a set of shared actions of 
design D1. In the first case, i2,j must be a non-private variable of D2, of the same sort 
as i1,j , and the pair i1,1-i2,1 denotes that the two variables are to be shared. In the 
second case, i2,j must be a set of shared actions of D2. Moreover, every shared action 
of the involved designs can appear at most once in the channel definition. Intuitively, 
a pair: 
{a1,1, . . . , a1,n}-{a2,1, . . . , a2,m} 
states that any action a1,i of D1 must occur simultaneously (i.e., synchronize) with 
some action a2,j of D2 and vice versa. 
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A configuration is given by an undirected labeled graph, where each node is 
labeled by a design and each arc by a channel, such that no node is connected to 
itself, and no two output variables are directly or indirectly shared. 
A run-time configuration is a configuration in which each node, besides being 
labeled with a design D, is also labeled with its current state, i.e., with one pair 
<l,value> for each local variable l of D. Because local variables cannot be shared 
among designs, it is not possible for two different nodes to have different values for 
the same variable. Hence, the colimit (a universal categorical construction) of a run-
time configuration always exists and is given by the colimit of the underlying 
configuration together with the disjoint union of all variable-value pairs. 
A key factor for architectural description is a notion of refinement that can be 
used to support abstraction. A design R refines design P if each variable of P is 
mapped to a variable of R of the same sort and kind (input, output or private), and 
each action of P is mapped to a set of actions of R of the same kind (private or 
shared), such that the functionality and interface (i.e., the “binding points”) of P are 
preserved. The interface is preserved by requiring the mapping of input and output 
variables to be injective and the image of a shared action to be a non-empty set. 
An architecture defines the designs that may be used as components/roles and the 
refinement relationships between them; the designs that may be used only for roles, 
the connectors, and the refinement morphisms for each role; the configuration 
variables; and a constraint on the possible configurations. 
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A common reconfiguration is to update a component (e.g., to add new 
functionality, eliminate bugs, or improve efficiency). This is achieved through the 
replacement of a component by a refinement other than the identity of it. The syntax:  
[Node2 :=] 
create Design2 as [Refinement(]Node1[)] 
with l1 := Exp1 k . . . 
where Node2 is of type Design2 and Node1’s type is some Design. This command 
removes Node1 and replaces it by a new node Node2. For any glue to which Node1 
was connected, through some channel c, the new node becomes connected to the 
same glue through a channel that is the composition of c with Refinement. 
The command to replace a component is the most complex one, because one 
cannot know a priori to which connectors the component to be replaced is attached. 
Therefore the command is compiled into a set of productions that do the replacement 
in three phases: The first introduces the new component, the second re-links all 
connectors to the new component, and the last phase removes the original component. 
For the second phase, there is one production for each role of each connector that the 
node to be replaced may initiate. 
For example, if there were two connectors C1(R1,R2) and C2(R4,R5,R6), and a 
node n1 of type N1 were to be replaced by a node n2 of type N2, with refinements from 
R1, R4 and R6 to N1, then there would be three productions; One replacing the first 
channel of C1 to n1 by a channel from C2 to n2, another production for the first 
channel of C2 and the last production for the third channel of C2. The set of 
productions generated for this second phase of the replacement is to be applied until 
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no left-hand side can be matched to the current configuration. At that point, the node 
to be replaced has no connectors attached and the single rule for the last phase can be 
applied: It simply removes the node, updating the node reference given in the 
command. 
Notes: 
This approach introduces a language that provides a high level construct of the 
system architecture. The language is capable of configuring and reconfiguring a 
system architecture offline and at run-time. The interactions in the language are 
created and removed at the level of connectors; this guarantees that the configurations 
are always instances of the architecture. This design adds more constraints on the 
architecture. The components of the language are not reusable and they are attached 
to the system components. Removing or modifying any component of the language 
will affect the system and its components. 
Another note on this approach is the transition phase in the replacement of the 
system component or reconfiguration. In most cases, the component might be 
involved in transactions or computations that are reading or writing data. The design 
did not address this issue because pointers and counters might be involved and 
because the reconfiguration might be lost. 
Rolling back to the previous configuration is not discussed. Guarantees of a better 
reconfiguration cannot be provided, based on the hand written scripts that govern the 
chosen new configuration. The choice of a bad configuration could lead the language 
into a series of reconfigurations; it might be better to roll-back to the previous 
configuration and chose another scenario. This issue was not discussed in the current 
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papers, yet the authors have the concept of evolving architecture suggested in future 
researches, which could be a solution to such a problem. 
2.6.2    Model-Based adaptation for self-healing systems.  
One of the main drives to this research paper is the need to decentralize the error 
checkers in the systems such as Java exceptions or RPC timeouts. They suffer from 
the problem that localized error handling may not be able to determine the true source 
of the problem, and hence the required remedial action. Moreover, while they can trap 
errors, they are not well-suited to recognizing “softer” system anomalies, such as 
gradual degradation of performance, or patterns of unreliability. They make it 
difficult to change adaptation policies, because they are so intertwined with the 
normal code of the system. 
 
 
Figure 1. Externalized Adaptation In A Model Based Self-Healing System [27] 
In a very rough description of the system, externalized adaptation supports a kind 
of closed-loop control system paradigm (Figure 1). In this paradigm, system behavior 
is monitored by components outside the running system. These components are 
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responsible for determining when a system’s behavior is within the envelope of 
acceptable system parameters, and when it falls outside of those limits, adapting the 
system. To accomplish these tasks, the externalized mechanisms maintain one or 
more system models, which provide an abstract, global view of the running system, 
and support reasoning about system problems and repairs. 
This approach [27] advertises the reuse of components, due to the fact that they 
are not localized. It also provides different models to choose from, which gives more 
control over the performance vs. reliability relationship. This brings the option of 
implementing new models easier and on demand. Security is preserved better with the 
priori knowledge of the system architectures available.  
The centerpiece of the approach is the use of architectural models, by using a 
simple scheme in which an architectural model is represented as a graph of 
interacting components. This is the core architectural representation scheme adopted 
by a number of architecture description languages (ADLs), including Acme, xADL, 
and SADL. 
To account for various behavioral properties of a system, elements in the graph 
can be annotated with property lists. For example, properties associated with a 
connector might define its protocol of interaction, or performance attributes, such as 
delay or bandwidth. Representing an architectural model as an arbitrary graph of 
generic components and connectors has the advantage of being extremely general and 
open ended. 
An architectural style typically defines a set of types for components, connectors, 
interfaces, and properties together with a set of rules that govern how elements of 
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those types may be composed. The challenge is to engineer things so that the system 
adapts appropriately at run time. To get information out of the running system, the 
model uses low-level monitoring mechanisms that refine various aspects of the 
executing system. This is done with the use of existing off-the-shelf performance-
oriented “system probes”. (In the implementation, Remos Monitoring System is 
used). 
To translate architectural repairs into actual system changes, the authors use a 
table-driven translator that interprets architectural repair operators in terms of the 
lower level system modifications. In the running system the monitoring mechanisms 
update architectural properties, causing re-evaluation of constraints. Violated 
constraints, such as high client-server latencies or low server loads trigger repairs, 
which are carried out on the architectural representation and translated into 
corresponding actions on the system itself. Matching the architectural style to the 
existing system infrastructure helps guarantee that relevant information can be 
extracted. The architectural changes can be propagated to the running system; 
architectural constraints are checked in the running system via a tool called Armani. 
Notes: 
Providing the tools in an externalized manner results in less overhead for the 
system components. It also prevents any changes to the monitoring tools from 
effecting the system components. Yet, the authors did not discuss the overhead on the 
communicating channels (monitors to the executing system, and among the 
adaptation system components). This overhead includes monitor probing and data 
analysis. 
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Another note on the use of Armani ADL is that it requires the administrator to 
handcraft the scripts for any suggested reconfigurations. Moreover it does not tolerate 
any mistakes or unhandled issues in the configuration. This forces the designer to 
write explicit constraints to prevent dangling roles, or in distributed systems, require 
reconfiguration scripts to connect the components port by port, for an example [30]. 
The proposed approach describes a monitoring and self-adapting mechanism for a 
system. The adaptation is not intended to reconfigure the system or change the 
architecture, but to tune up the components of the system. In conclusion, it is an 
adaptation to a changing environment. Yet the approach is not used in the actual 
implementation, and it does not affect the tuning up of the system. A better use of the 
model is to use the ADL to swap components that are causing a bottleneck due to a 
bug in the execution. The ADL is a good tool to reconfigure the system where a fresh 
copy is swapped and the component is re-located in a less active role in the new 
architecture. By doing so, any problems of traffic or malfunctioning could be solved. 
2.6.3    The DMonA Architecture. 
In this paper [28], the authors are proposing the DiPS (Distrinet Protocol Stack) 
component architecture as a solution to develop manageable system software such as 
file systems or protocol stacks. DiPS separate functionality from other aspects such as 
inter-component communication and internal parallelism. The paper argues that such 
separation of concerns makes managing specific aspects, such as concurrency, easier. 
The system is constructed of reusable components that adapt themselves to cope with 
changing circumstances. 
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The approach uses DMonA, the DiPS monitor and management extension 
architecture (Figure 2), which allows detection of performance bottlenecks, proposes 
solutions and deploys them at run-time. The authors focus on the run-time adaptation 
initiated by the system itself, using self-monitoring tools. 
The main goal for DiPS is to support reuse and adaptation at design-time as well 
as at run-time. The DiPS component (packet) is a building block surrounded with an 
explicit entry (forwarder) and exit (receiver) points. Data is encapsulated within the 
packet. DiPs system is created by connecting packets into a pipe. A dispatcher unit 
dispatches requests into different branches of the pipe based on meta-information in 
the request. 
 
Figure 2. Communication Channels Between Dmona And Dips Layers. 
DMonA is a monitoring and management extension of the DiPS component 
architecture. It takes advantage of existing abstractions of the packets (entry and exit 
points). Management can be divided in three sub tasks: detecting problems (self-
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monitoring), proposing solutions to the problem (self-adapting), and deploying the 
proposed solution (self-healing). 
The primary goals of DMonA are to provide with DiPS a self-adapting system 
that can be applied in different contexts, with sensors and monitors that can be 
changed according to the context. DMonA and DiPS are orthogonal, meaning that the 
removal or modification of DMonA will not affect the functionality of DiPS, 
allowing the reusability of the DMonA components outside the DiPS system. 
The sensors provide the required information from the functional level to the 
monitors, which are used to evaluate and manage the system. The sensors are of two 
types: state sensors which provide information about the internal state of the system 
and analysis sensors which provide information about the messages flow in the 
system. Based on the gathered information from the monitors, DMonA chooses the 
proper action to improve the system’s performance. 
After a problem is detected, a solution is proposed by the adaptability strategy, 
and then is applied. The performance is then monitored again to check the efficiency 
of the chosen strategy. 
Notes: 
The adaptability strategy that chooses the solutions for the detected problems is 
not well described. The paper does not explain the mechanisms of choosing the 
appropriate strategy or how this strategy was put together in the first place. A good 
approach to construct a solution is the use of xADL to provide architecture 
reconfiguration tools that can be monitored and adjusted based on the changing 
demands (environment). Keep in mind that ADL tools are not self evolving and 
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require a hands-on updating of the changing settings, which includes script writing 
and management. 
Another aspect the authors did not discuss is the feedback from the system on the 
quality of the proposed solution. A rollback technique, though may not be needed, but 
still in place to be included in the design, to prevent looping in search for an optimal 
performance. To solve those two issues, a special monitor could be added to provide a 
feedback to the strategy management on the initial system performance, or to provide 
a statistical comparison between the previous architecture and the suggested 
reconfiguration. 
2.6.4    Kinesthetics eXtreme (KX). 
This approach [29] introduces a dynamic adaptation facility. The infrastructure 
consists of multiple layers, with the objectives of: 
1. Probing, measuring and reporting of activity and state during the execution of 
the target system among its components and connectors; 
2. Gauging, analysis and interpretation of the reported events; 
3. Whenever necessary, providing feedback onto the probes and gauges to focus 
them, or onto the running target system to direct its automatic adjustment and 
reconfiguration. 
This approach to adaptation adds a feedback control loop outside and orthogonal 
to the legacy system’s main computation, control and communication. 
The first interaction the KX has with the system is through the probes that provide 
feedback to the monitors. The probes should have a minimally invasive approach that 
can be guaranteed to have zero or negligible effect on the performance and reliability 
 40 
of the system. A probe here is an individual sensor attached to or associated with a 
running program. The probe can sense some portion of the program’s execution and 
make this data available by issuing events. Probes are reusable components that can 
be customized and adjusted based on the running environment. 
A Smart Event XML scheme is introduced as a standard format for structuring the 
probes output; each probe has a unique identifier and tag structure appropriate for 
reuse outside the current architecture. 
Gauges are software entities that gather, filter, aggregate, compute, and/or analyze 
measurement information about the software systems, interpreting the information 
gathered by the probes. Gauges operate within a framework consisting of two major 
components: event packager transforms raw data format from the probes output into 
Smart Events, and event distiller which recognizes complex temporal event patterns 
from multiple probe sources, and constructs higher-level measurements to reflect the 
system state represented by the events. The Event Distiller is “programmed” by a 
collection of condition/action rules. 
Gauge outputs are inputs to a decision process that determines what course of 
action to take, if any. The decision process may be supported by a variety of tools, 
including an architecture transformation tool that reacts to gauges that detect 
differences between the running and the nominal architecture. Executing high-level 
repair actions such as to reconfiguring the architecture will often involve several 
activities at the implementation level. Some of these activities may be conditional or 
dependent on others, or may simply fail, so the adaptation process is expressed as a 
workflow rich enough to express contingency plans. This decision and control layer 
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might also invoke the management actions of the probe and gauge layers on occasion, 
to induce refined measurements before proceeding with adaptation. 
Workflakes is used to instantiate and coordinate all kinds of adaptations of the 
running system, as a decentralized workflow system. The workflow is currently 
expressed as a set of coding patterns in Java, which are then dynamically loaded into 
and executed by the Workflakes engine. The language needs to specify both 
sequential and parallel execution of actions, and how to deal with unsuccessful 
actions, by retrying, attempting alternate actions, rolling back or compensating 
changes. 
Effector (implementation) actions cover a spectrum from simple adaptations such 
as relatively low-level adjustments, to a well-defined target system API (changing a 
process variable or calling a method), to potentially complex reconfiguration 
commands that cause structurally significant changes, possibly involving high-level 
adjustments at the system/environmental level. The latter may involve starting, 
migrating, restarting, or stopping one or more processes, and/or rearranging the 
connections among components. Workflakes currently conducts an adaptation 
workflow by selecting, instantiating and dispatching Worklets mobile agents (hand 
crafted), and coordinating the activities of the deployed Worklets on the target 
system’s components and connectors. 
Notes: 
The approach mentioned in this paper has considered all the aspects of monitoring 
and analyzing the gathered data. It also provided a strategy, or adaptation, mechanism 
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to choose the best reconfiguration and provide feedback on that change to adjust the 
gauges performance. 
Workflakes is chosen to apply the changes, based on a hand written script. It 
would be a good change to have a self adapting Worklets on the system (evolving 
code) that uses previous gathered data and produces a script that fits its expected 
future data. The script could be generated and analyzed for predictability before 
actually being implemented or provided to Workflakes. 
The use of ADL is being mentioned in the future work that the group is looking 
for, but the exact version of ADL or where they want to use it in the current model is 
not discussed. 
2.7 Bandwidth Control. 
 Controlling the communication bandwidth in Microsoft Windows is possible and 
relatively simple. Starting from the basics of networking, a networking protocol depends 
on the ISO Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. The model determines the type 
of the connection between two nodes, and therefore sets the parameters of the connection. 
In the protocol stack, the transport layer governs the connection speed and data flow. This 
is the key control to the bandwidth of the connection. 
 A networking adaptor in MS Windows is designed to utilize the highest bandwidth 
possible from the connection. Yet, Windows provides the capability to manually adjust 
this parameter and choose the appropriate network speed. 
 The options provided in Windows 2000, NT and XP allow the administrator to adjust 
the connection speed to auto, 100Mbps full duplex, 100Mbps half duplex, 10Mbps full 
 43 
duplex, 10Mbps half duplex, or disable. This property can be controlled using Common 
Language Infrastructure (CLI) [33], and can be embedded in the code of the agent. 
 Reducing the bandwidth down to the allowed settings may not be the optimal answer 
to control the communications that the agent is trying to degrade in order to prevent the 
spread of the malware. Additionally, with the use of firewalls, all communication ports 
on the machine can be blocked, with the exception of the one port that the agent is using 
to communicate on the network. The choice of the port is a limited random selection, 
providing protection for the agent from being attacked by malware that might attempt to 
block its communication port. 
 The port control is managed by the firewall, as it prevents any communication from 
happening unless being certified. This will provide a bottle neck for the malware to 
communicate, given that by its nature, it will attempt to consume all the available 
bandwidth. Other self applications might have the capability to locate open ports to 
provide connectivity, and they will add more pressure on the port and on the malware. 
2.8 Processes Control. 
 In the search for the processes control in the Microsoft Windows environment, a 
possible control paradigm can be applied from within MS Windows. The operating 
system provides a capability to control the priorities for executing the processes, which is 
extended into ending a process. Using the Common Language Infrastructure (CLI) 
commands, the agent could adjust the priority of a process, which gives the other self 
processes the privilege of taking most of the processor(s) time. 
 Another capability of the operating system is to assign priorities to processes across 
an entire array of processors. In this case, the agent should be aware that degrading the 
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priority of the process will not prevent it from the chance to execute on another processor 
in multi processor systems. Therefore, it should assign all the targeted processes to a 
single processor, with high restrictions. 
 This solution may not be the best to handle the processes and their behaviors. In an 
article published in 1993, Wahbe et al. [34] discussed a framework for handling fault 
isolation, and a way to sandbox a process by assigning a separate processing area where 
the process is not allowed to write or jump outside it. Small and Seltzer [35] extend this 
concept by saying that even a read operation can change the priorities and privileges for 
resources’ requests. 
 In this model, a better approach to handle novel processes that are still not classified 
as self components, is to apply a sandbox technique. Modern programing languages 
including C# and Java Corba can facilitate the control of processes by performing 
sandbox operation on them in a virtual processing environment and even manag the 
execution of these processes’ threads [36]. This control can be performed in micro-kernel 
as added extensions, or can be done outside the kernel to prevent any violations to the 
kernel functionality in critical systems. 
 Windows Runas command can be used by the agent to provide simple control of the 
process. This can provide privilege control over the process, but it does not control the 
process activity and occupation of the processor time. User-level sandbox operations are 
an ideal mode to perform the control on the processes; this is performed by modifying the 
address space of all processes or logical protection domain to contain one or more shared 
pages of virtual addresses [37]. This method can control the privileges (write, read, and 
jump operations) which the process can perform; the extensions applied on the kernel can 
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perform restrictions on the process piping for execution. This approach provides the ideal 
platform for controlling the processes. 
 In a review of our model, the best approach to control the non-self processes can be 
achieved by providing a sandbox environment for all the new processes. A sandbox 
environment provides a temporary storage for process output, and a virtual processing 
parameters and tools, such as registers and controllers. All the transactions that these 
processes perform can be rolled back if proven malicious, by simply dumping the 
temporary memory locations and files. If the application is registered by the administrator 
as self-component, then it can be allowed outside the sandbox to execute in the real 
environment by redirecting its pointers to the real processing environment. All the 
processes in the virtual space are prevented from exiting the controlled area until their 
signatures are extracted and identified by the agent or administrator as safe. This saves 
the time to recover from potential damage by containing the supposed effect in a throw 
away temporary storage, or for possible future changes, if needed. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Basis of the Approach. 
 The primary concept this study is based upon is the approximation between the 
human immune system (HIS) and the artificial immune system (AIS). Therefore, the 
components of the AIS need to act in the same manner as the HIS components. Based on 
this approximation, any additions or modifications to the system can be derived from the 
HIS actual working (artificial life approach). 
 As discussed in section 2.1, the white cells in the HIS perform their function in a trial 
and error process. The cells try a certain protein compound to kill the antigen, and if it 
does not work, it will continue trying new compounds until the correct one is found, 
cloned and spread throughout the body. The agent in the AIS behaves in the same 
manner, using the antivirus and the signature extraction tools to try to identify the antigen 
and to remove it from the system. In this approximation, the agent acts like the B cells in 
the HIS. 
 Another basic concept used in this study is the reuse of the already provided 
components of the security systems such as antivirus software. This reuse will alleviate 
the cost of rebuilding the components by using applications tested previously and used in 
real systems. 
 Sandbox technique is another concept that provides protection from malware, by 
putting the new processes in a virtual processing area, to monitor them and prevent any 
malicious changes to the system. If the new process was certified by the administrator, it 
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is then released to be executed in the real system and be allowed to utilize the system’s 
resources. 
3.2 The System’s Architecture 
Despite all the efforts in trying to reach better security, hackers are still able to pose a 
great threat to the computer systems with the help of the technology advancement. One of 
the main factors is time, through which the security systems’ developers can react to a 
threat posed by the attacker. An analyst can look at the attack in an attempt to build an 
antidote, after which the system becomes immune from the same attack again. The nature 
of the beast is that viruses and the like have to strike first before the anti-viral is 
prescribed. This is similar to the HIS, where the disease has to first attack the body before 
it receives the medicine or treatment. 
The architecture proposed here depends on the teamwork among the security 
applications; their work must be coordinated to avoid wasting time in identifying one 
another and resolving conflicts among them. The model is implemented on distributed 
system architecture (Figure 3), and the operating system has a multi processing capability 
to allow the agent to handle more than one process at one time. 
In this architecture, the operating system environment is assumed to give capabilities 
and permissions for programs to call each other and execute code embedded within other 
containers, such as scripts in emails or mobile code in HTML containers. This is the 
worst case scenario for security, but it is the most spreading configuration among Internet 
users with machines using MS Windows. These settings must be disabled to prevent 
many intrusions; most average users do not know the severity of keeping such options 
enabled without proper monitoring. 
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Figure 3. Structure of the Proposed Network Model. 
 
Antivirus (AV) developers depend on code signature to identify viruses, at the same 
time virus developers strive to develop techniques to elude the virus scanning 
mechanism, such as using polymorphic viruses to camouflage copies of the virus. 
Polymorphic viruses change its virus signature (i.e. its binary pattern) every time it 
replicates, yet the core of the virus remains the same, and what is actually changing is the 
shell around the virus. In an attempt to partially solve this problem, anomaly-based 
intrusion detection (ID) and behavioral-based malware detection were introduced to help 
encounter unknown threats that have predictable behavior. In many experimental cases, 
these techniques proved effective with new threats, but more work needs to be done to 
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improve them; mainly, in the field of adaptability to new anomalies. Recognition is 
improved by using techniques such as neural networks to recognize new patterns of the 
behavior to reproduce better generations of the recognizers and reach better optimization. 
Research in this field is still in progress and requires more confidence in the approach. In 
interest of “brevity”, the current state-of-the-art in this field is accepted as given. 
3.3 Characteristics and design of the Agent. 
A definition of a software agent is “a software entity which functions continuously 
and autonomously in a particular environment often inhabited by other agents and 
processes” [13]. Other definitions found in the literature portray the same concepts with 
different wording. In essence, for a program to be considered as an agent, it has the 
following characteristics [3]: 
• Reactivity: the ability to selectively sense and act. 
• Autonomy: goal-directedness, proactive and self-starting behavior. 
• Collaborative behavior: can work in concert with other agents to achieve a common 
goal. 
• Knowledge-level communication ability: the ability to communicate with persons 
and other agents with language more resembling humanlike “speech acts” than 
typical symbol-level program-to-program protocols. 
• Inferential capability: can act on abstract task specification using prior knowledge of 
general goals and preferred methods to achieve flexibility; goes beyond the 
information given, and may have explicit models of self, user, situation, and/or other 
agents. 
• Temporal continuity: persistence of identity and state over long periods of time. 
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• Personality: the capability of manifesting the attributes of a “believable” character 
such as emotion. 
• Adaptivity: being able to learn and improve with experience. 
• Mobility: being able to migrate in a self-directed way from one host platform to 
another. 
It is worth mentioning the difference between an agent and a daemon, where a 
daemon is a program that runs continuously and exists for the purpose of handling 
periodic service requests that a computer system expects to receive. The daemon program 
forwards the requests to other programs (or processes) as appropriate. For an example, 
each server of pages on the Web has Hypertext Transfer Protocol daemon (HTTPD) that 
continually waits for requests to come in from Web clients and their users. The main 
difference between a daemon and an agent in this study is that a daemon can not make 
decisions on proper actions; it simply receives and carries out commands while the agent 
makes decisions and gives command to other applications. 
An agent should be able to carry out activities in a flexible and intelligent manner; it 
should be responsive to changes in the environment without requiring constant human 
guidance or intervention. In this architecture, the agent intelligence is very primitive, the 
fact that it is simulating the B-cells which shows no intelligence but a mere systematic 
process. In future work of the agent, the behavioral monitors could be constructed to be 
able to adapt to new anomalies and train them to add to its knowledge, which will add 
intelligence characteristics to the agent. The agent should function continuously in an 
environment over a long period of time and be able to learn from its experience. 
Furthermore it inhabits an environment with other agents and processes. 
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In this application, the agent has a main goal to manage the components of the AIS, 
by directing their attention, and managing their reactions. For an example, the agent 
utilizes the AV to scan suspect processes, while the AV is in the status of in-the-fly scan, 
which requires the AV to scan the agent first to assure its validity. Afterwards the agent 
will direct the AV to activate a custom scan of the target. At which time, the agent should 
be inferential of the standard process of the AV. Otherwise a deadlock might occur where 
each task preserve the right to go first. To achieve coordination, the AV provider has to 
modify his product to allow the agent to assume control over the AV. 
Another important task is the reproduction, which aids the agent in gaining an overall 
system control [8]. The agent cannot have the ability to know everything happening in 
the whole domain. However, it is task oriented, so it is able to provide complete control 
of its local domain. This requires the agent to have duplicates in every station in the 
domain to dominate locally after gathering the required information to function in their 
new environment. Agents should have a kind of identification such as encrypted 
identification keys, to provide validity and a correctness check and to avoid hoax agents. 
The regeneration of the agents should be done from a controlled station such as a server 
machine. This server provides the identification keys to the agents, and sends them to the 
stations that are requesting them. 
If the agent engages a malware in one machine, then it triggers an alert to all other 
agents in the other machines in the domain. After the current suspected code is handled, 
the high alert situation is removed and the normal operational configuration is restored. 
Agents have a certain critical age defined by the administrator to assure the agent always 
have the latest anomaly algorithms. When the agent reaches its critical age it reports to 
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the server to be terminated and a fresh copy of the latest agent is generated and released 
to inhabit the node. 
The next task the agent should be able to handle is reading the signature of the 
malware. The entire AV products perform signature extraction on the code that they scan. 
Researchers in IBM describe and provide an automated mechanism that can extract the 
signature of a virus or any code [7]. In following comments on the IBM research site, the 
author discusses the new threats of macros and worms, and provides an alteration to the 
virus-signature extraction approach to handle the new threats. So an automated technique 
could be utilized within the agent to identify the malware signature, yet the technique 
offered refers to certain cases where the human interference is required, such as handling 
polymorphic code. In this architecture, polymorphic code is still in a sandbox, and the act 
of replicating is a sufficient condition to identify an anomaly. 
Another working of the agent is the sandbox technique performed to deprive the 
malware of the freedom of movement, while providing a better environment for the AV 
to work with the code, and protecting the system from any actions the malware might 
perform. Sandbox in this case includes a rollback of any changes the malware performed, 
to avoid any changes that are not desirable if the code was identified as “harmful” 
afterwards (refer to [36] and [37] for details on this process). Those changes include any 
attempted outgoing communications, registry changes and any other parameters or saved 
data. 
 The agent is the cornerstone of this system. It monitors the behavior of the system, 
decides the proper action, and reports to the administrator. To perform the required 
actions, it must have a goal to achieve, which is to prevent any non-self code from 
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executing freely. Another requirement for its success is the plan based on stimuli/reaction 
pairs [31]. The plan might actually consist of more than one sequence of actions and 
possible alternative actions to be followed throughout the agent life cycle.  
 To provide the agent with some feedback to help facilitate its workings, a knowledge 
base is provided. This acts as the memory for the agent, to distinguish self from non-self 
components. The agent monitors the environment by applying probes on the processes in 
sandboxes to provide knowledge of anomaly existence [32]. To provide the agent with 
reference to the boundaries that it needs to govern, a periodic count of the base running 
processes is generated by the agent. This information is provided by the probes to 
conduct a comparison and tell of the existence of newly added processes. The count 
contains the number of processes loaded in the safe and clean startup of the system. This 
provides the agent a reference to observe. When the administrator installs a new 
application, the agent requires the administrator to register the new application in the 
knowledge base. This updates the signature database (the agent performed signature 
extraction of the new application) by adding the new signature to its memory. The 
knowledge base contains all the signatures of the applications installed by the 
administrator.  
 The administrator is informed of the existence of the anomaly by the agent, and is 
informed of the system’s behavior. The agent encourages the administrator’s 
intervention, but can manage without it. If the agent becomes overwhelmed with new 
processes and could not handle them, then the administrator needs to terminate some of 
the processes in the sandboxes to allow the agent space to work, or inject the system with 
the proper antigen if it is available at that point. Frequent updates of the AV definitions 
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are very helpful to the agent, to go through the shorter process of just cleaning, rather 
than the longer process of sandbox, investigate and clean.  
3.4 Architecture workflow 
Once a station is started, the station will request an agent from the server, this is like 
requesting an IP address from a DHCP server, or MS Windows checking for updates. The 
request includes the station identity encrypted by its private key and a time stamp. The 
station identity can be a combination of identifying characteristics, for an example its 
MAC address, the machine name, and a password. The server and the station identify 
each others request and reply using asymmetric cryptosystem. If the request is valid, the 
server will send an agent to the system with the server identity, and then the system 
verifies the agent’s validity and executes it. 
The agent starts it work by instructing the AV to perform a scan of the memory for 
known malware. Once the AV returns with a clean memory result, the agent runs a scan 
of the memory and extracts the signature of all the processes and puts them in a table, 
then checks each signature against a database of self processes. For each process, if a 
process is a “non-self”, the agent will inform the administrator of its existence, puts it in a 
sandbox (which is a virtual processing environment) using the sandbox tools, and starts 
preventive action, which will be explained later.  
When a process is loaded in memory, the agent sandbox it in a virtual environment to 
ensure that it does not perform any illegal operations or harmful acts. The agent identifies 
processes by extracting their signatures and then search for the signature in a database of 
known/trusted applications to avoid a sandbox operation of self components. In general, 
agents reside in the stations performing the B-cell job in the HIS by looking for any 
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suspicious activity such as a process cloning or reproducing. The agent realizes such fact 
by using the behavioral monitoring tools which identify such anomalies.  
When the process is loaded in memory, the agent directs the AV to scan it against 
known malware, then it is terminated and the administrator is informed. If the AV could 
not recognize it as malware, it will be allowed to execute in its sandbox until the 
administrator instructs the agent to allow it to execute outside the sandbox or terminate it. 
If the administrator identifies the process as friendly, the agent logs it in its memory 
database as “self”. In the future, if the same process activates again it will not be put in a 
sandbox. If the administrator says that the process is unfamiliar, then the agent will 
perform preventive action which allows the process to continue executing in its sandbox 
under supervision of the anomaly detection tools. If the process at any time performs an 
anomaly, the agent will inform the administrator and terminate the process which 
includes dumping all the changes made in the virtual processing environment in a 
temporary file for the administrator to evaluate. This can be stored in a quarantined 
machine controlled and used only by administrators. The signature of the anomaly is 
added to the AV and ID database to be considered in the future as a malware. This 
database is accessed by all the agents on the network to update their AV and ID to 
identify the malicious process and terminate it (Figure 4). 
If the administrator can not identify the process then it will remain in the sandbox to 
execute, providing it does not show any odd behavior. This will lead to two possible 
scenarios: the process will finish executing normally, which requires it to exit the 
sandbox, but all the changes are saved in temporary files for the administrator to evaluate 
if he wishes, then he can decide to commit these changes or just dump them. The other 
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possibility is that the process will terminate due to the sandbox effect, such as running out 
of resources or not receiving responses, this will result in saving all the changes made in 
the virtual environment for future action by the administrator and the owner of the 
process to be notified of the reason of the termination.  
 
Figure 4. Immunity Propagation Among The Nodes. 
 
If the agent detects an anomaly, the administrator is alerted of the specific action, and 
asked if he wishes to trust the process, if the administrator agrees to trust the process, 
then the agent will instruct the sandbox tools to allow the process to execute outside the 
sandbox. Otherwise the agent will terminate the process and throw away all the changes 
made by this process, informs the administrator, then the process’ signature is added to 
the AV and ID database as a known malware. By doing so, the agent prevented the 
malware from making changes outside the sandbox, and helped keeping it in a controlled 
environment which concludes the preventive action of the agent work. 
On the other frontiers, the ID handles the intrusion detection with two techniques, 
anomaly detection and pattern recognition. The first technique develops a 
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sense/knowledge of the type of the transmitted data by gathering information based on a 
random collection of propagating data on the network. This can be classified as the 
training phase. Next is a random inspection and detection of the transmitted data on the 
network. This is considered the practical phase. If any abnormal data transfer occurs 
afterward, such transaction is put in a sandbox and the administrator is informed. Pattern 
recognition is used to check for certain patterns in the transactions, such as brute-force 
attacks or a code’s signature. 
Another aspect is the Firewall, which manages the port connections coming into or 
going out of the network. The administrator has to manually set the policies to suit his 
vision for a secure gateway to his network. This part is an analogy to the parts of the 
human body; which allow communication with the external world. The firewall is 
running all the time with no ports left open unless the administrator allows for a good 
reason. Due to the fact that reconnaissance is important before any attack, log files must 
be monitored to try to prevent future attacks. Auditing the log files can help identify any 
bizarre attempts that may be an introduction to a more serious threat. The administrator 
should define two sets of policies, one for normal situations and another to be used when 
an anomaly is detected. Processes in a sandbox are not allowed to use the network, but 
providing limited access monitored by the ID can be allowed, as long as there are no 
anomalies in the system. If the agent declares an anomaly, the FW will apply its strict 
policy which prevents processes in sandboxes to use the network. 
 Appendix B provides a diagram of a visual description and an algorithm of the 
workflow of the agent. Additional figures are provided to visualization of the sandbox 
technique performed on new processes. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Summary. 
 In chapter 1, this paper laid out the problem of malware and the difficulty in handling 
such code. The current approach to handle malware is to wait for it to hit then subscribe 
the cure. The purpose of the study was introduced, which is to use the human immune 
system (HIS) as a base for an approach to the artificial immune system (AIS), using 
agents to act as the B-cells and provide the artificial system with the self-healing 
capability against malicious software.  
 Chapter 2 provided a summary of the literature review done on the related subjects to 
this research, which provide better understanding of the biological model; it also included 
a look at the research on the AIS and the approaches to achieve a good comparison 
between the biological immune systems and the AIS. It is important to understand the 
threats that a system faces. Section 2.3 provides a brief look at the models of malware 
and their techniques. An approximation between the HIS components and the proposed 
AIS components was presented in section 2.4. The approximation provided an approach 
to design the agent to perform like the B-cells. Another idea used is the technique that the 
white cells follow when searching for the right protein compound that can be used against 
certain antigens. This concept inspires the trial and error approach that the agent uses to 
extract the signature of the malware to identify and remove it. 
 Self-healing systems were also reviewed in section 2.5 to get an understanding of the 
approaches used to provide the artificial systems with a self-healing capability without 
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the need to take them off-line. A comparative study was provided to describe the 
strengths and weaknesses in the current research of self-healing. This comparison 
provides a novel approach to design a self-healing system against malware. The last two 
sections of chapter 2 described the possibility of controlling a process’ speed and the 
communication bandwidth from within the agent’s code. 
 Chapter 3 introduced the functionality of the system with section 3.1 describing the 
basis of the approach in the design of the architecture. The system architecture was 
introduced in the following section to present detailed functionality of the system. 
Section 3.3 provided the agent characteristics and design that enable it to control its 
environment and perform its job. Based on the provided architecture, the agent 
implementation is likely a straight forward operation that can be implemented within a 
proper environment of software development. 
4.2 Conclusions. 
 Complete security is a dream, like every other dream we strive to make it a reality, 
even though we know it is almost impossible, but we have to try.  
 When this research started, the main concern was to provide the administrator with 
better control over the applications installed on his machine. With a closer look at the 
problems that face this approach, the research diverted toward finding a better way to 
handle malware in general with the use of smart code such as an agent. To provide a 
work frame for such an agent, the agent’s living environment must be examined. That is 
where the approach of artificial life became a part of the research. Putting all these 
elements together provides a self-healing system, inspired by the human (biological) 
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immune system, for healing from security “diseases”. Therefore, this research provides a 
bridge between the mere self-healing approaches and the security concerns. 
 So far, self-healing studies focus on components swapping and architecture 
reconfiguration. These studies do not consider the security aspect of the system, and do 
not discuss the existence of malware as a component in the system. If such malware 
exists, a current self-healing system would treat it as a valid component with a bug, and 
would simply relocate it, possibly increasing its threat. Table 2 provides a comparative 
description of four recent approaches to self-healing systems, introduced in the last 
workshop on self-healing systems 2002. In the table, different approaches are described 
for viewing the system components and handling suggested changes. 
 
 Graph based 
reconfiguration 
Model-based 
adaptation 
DMonA 
architecture 
KX approach 
Ability to force 
reconfiguration 
online 
Can be 
implemented 
Can be 
implemented 
Can be 
implemented 
Can be 
implemented 
Reusability of 
the self-healing 
components 
Not applicable Applicable. 
Adds overhead 
to 
communication 
channels 
Applicable. 
DMonA and 
DiPS are 
independent 
applications. 
Applicable. 
Components 
are independent 
software 
entities. 
Dependability 
among self-
healing 
components 
Tightly bonded, 
failure of one 
component 
might cause the 
system to 
malfunction  
Lightly bonded. 
Components 
can be changed 
and moved 
without 
affecting the 
system 
performance 
Work 
separately, 
needs each 
other to 
complete the 
job. Location is 
irrelevant. 
Totally 
independent. 
Could be used 
by other 
applications 
while not in use 
by the self-
healing system 
Handling 
running 
operations (in 
process 
transactions) 
Running 
transactions will 
be lost. No 
temporary 
storage or 
pointer handling 
Use of ADL 
provides control 
over the 
transaction’s 
pointers. 
Data are 
encapsulated. 
Data pipelines 
are removed as 
a whole. 
No discussed in 
the literature. 
Indicated 
possible with 
the use of XML 
smart schemes. 
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Rollback to 
previous 
configuration 
Not provided. 
Memory 
configuration is 
not discussed. 
Not provided. 
Configuration 
memory is not 
discussed. 
Not included, 
but could be 
implemented.  
Discussed in 
detail. Uses 
Workflakes 
with 
configuration 
memory. 
Feedback on the 
new 
configuration 
Not discussed 
in the current 
publications. 
Mentioned in 
future work. 
Immediate 
evaluation of 
the system 
performance 
after the change 
is made. 
No discussed. 
Monitors are 
available to 
evaluate the 
change. 
Provides 
feedback to 
focus gauges 
and probes, to 
provide better 
reading of the 
system 
performance. 
Location of the 
monitoring 
tools 
Instances of the 
architecture. 
Provides better 
knowledge, but 
extra overhead. 
External to the 
system 
components. 
External to the 
system 
components. 
Parts of the 
monitoring 
applications. 
External to the 
system 
components. 
Independent 
applications. 
Reconfiguration 
strategy scripts 
Handwritten 
scripts of 
possible 
configurations 
Tuning the 
system 
components to 
gain better 
performance. 
Strategy 
management 
application 
handles the 
changes in the 
configuration. 
Uses 
Workflakes 
with scripts of 
possible 
configurations. 
Use of 
descriptive 
languages 
Not used. Uses ADL. DMonA 
application uses 
xADL. 
Workflakes. 
Feedback 
techniques on 
the changes 
Not provided. 
Discussed in 
future work, 
using 
evolutionary 
computation. 
No tools used, 
only test system 
performance. 
Not included in 
the design. 
Not provided. 
Probes and 
gauges could be 
used to provide 
feedback to the 
XML event 
schemes. 
Malware 
handling 
capability 
Does not recognize malware, may relocate it as a legitimate 
component. Will possibly dump the changes made, but will not 
terminate it. Lack of feedback on system performance may result in an 
infinite loop of changes exhausting the system’s resources. Reusability 
of the system components may result in spread of the infection outside 
the current station and possibly throughout the domain.  
Table 2. Comparison Between Four Self-Healing Systems. 
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The components of the system are all available in the market or under development, 
except for the agent proposed here. Antivirus and intrusion detection applications are 
researched continuously, with new features and techniques added with every new release, 
modifying them to accept the agent control is possible and required to achieve the overall 
system’s goal. Sandbox techniques and tools have been used in testing and evaluating 
applications, with capability to log every action made to decide on either commit these 
actions or abandon them later. Anomaly detectors have been used in intrusion detection 
techniques for a long time, and antivirus applications have recently adopted this 
technique to detect polymorphic malware, but with limited success. Anomaly detectors 
still need to be improved, but with the introduction of neural networks, it is possible to 
achieve better results. 
 New processes do not always have to be malware, the number of false positives 
depend on the sensitivity of the agent which is governed by the anomaly detectors. 
Predicting these values can be realized only by implementing and testing the proposed 
architecture. The administrator attention is needed, to reduce the number of false 
positives, yet it is not required. Absence of the administrator will result in loosing great 
amount of the memory and system resources to the new processes in the sandboxes, 
which will result in overall system slow performance. The administrator can adjust the 
agent response to leave the decision to him, but that will require the administrator to 
devote a lot of his time monitoring and responding to the agent’s requests. If the users of 
the system utilize the same type of applications, the system will have a steady learning 
curve after all the standard applications have been executed at least once, this brings the 
number of new processes much lower, giving the administrator more free time. 
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 The self-healing architecture as described in this paper can be implemented and will 
probably deliver the expected service. The success ratio can only be determined after the 
actual implementation, but all the components have sensitivity parameters that can be 
adjusted to decide the overall system sensitivity. One of these parameters is the 
administrator and his involvement in the system’s operations.  
 The current research and development of sandbox tools and anomaly detectors means 
that certain parts of this architecture may need to be developed alongside the 
development of the architecture. This could be considered by some as a road block, but it 
could be a good derive to enhance and test such tools within a working system. 
4.3 Model Weaknesses. 
 
 Applying security to a system means applying restrictions on the components of the 
system. This is noticed not only in computer systems, but also in real life situations. 
These restrictions can result in less efficiency, slowness and the possible lessening of 
functionality in the original system. 
 This fact applies to this model, as a huge tradeoff is expected between 
efficiency/speed and security. The agent will execute new processes in a sandbox which 
requires more space from the memory and more time from the I/O devices. The firewall 
will secure the communication gateways to prevent the spread of the malware and the ID 
will filter all the network transactions when a threat is seen. This is not necessarily 
pleasant for the users, but slow performance is better rather than the consequence of 
malware spread, paralyzing the whole system later.  
 Users who are executing the new processes will notice a very slow performance due 
to executing these processes in a sandbox. The process is living in a virtual environment, 
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meaning that it is another layer over the operating system. The operations that are 
executed by that process are not committed until the administrator agrees on its safety. 
Here, if the administrator can not identify the process it might terminate due to the lack of 
resources in the sandbox environment. 
 In this model, if the agent notices a generation of processes with different signatures, 
it will sandbox them and try to monitor all of them. This means that the agent will be 
busy and will use a big chunk of the processor time and memory space. This generation 
of the processes can be either a malware regenerating with polymorphic technique, or it 
can be a simple compiler generating processes for a user writing a program and running 
it. All these processes are not signed in because the programmer is still debugging and 
fixing the code. This model will not handle this situation in a good manner, except by 
blocking all requests from that user; other solutions could be applied to fix this problem, 
depending on the nature of the system and the possible use of its services. 
 Administrator attention can be of great help in this architecture. In the human body, a 
kidney is not planted without the proper tests to make sure it has the correct signature. 
The same applies in this model; the administrator saves the agent a lot of trouble by 
defining a process as “self”, resulting in the agent saving the system’s time bypassing the 
analysis and monitoring of the new process 
 In many cases, a new malware is possibly not a threat to a system if the system users 
are cautious enough in their daily use. This means the malware will have an antivirus 
signature produced by the AV producers before the malware reaches the system. 
Therefore the administrator is required to stay up-to-date with the new virus signatures 
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and AV updates. This will save a huge amount of time that the agent might have spent 
trying to handle the malware, when the cure is already available. 
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Appendix A: Human Immune System Components 
Figure 5. The Process By Which T Cells And B Cells Interact With Antigens [6]. 
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Figure 6. Graphical Representation of the Life Cycle of T Cells and B Cells and Their 
Interactions with Antigens. 
From University of Hartford, Department of Mathematics, Epidemics and AIDS web 
page [6]. 
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Appendix B: Agent Design 
Figure 7. Agent Structure And Flow Diagram 
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Algorithm 1: Agent algorithm. 
initializeAgent (){ 
 requestAgent (timestamp, hashkey) 
 Receive agent from server 
 If valid hash key{ //run agent 
 Agent() 
 } 
}//end AgentCreation  
Agent(){ 
 Run antivirus to scan and clean system memory for known malware 
for each process in memory{ 
signature=extractSignature(processID) 
  Scan memory for processes according to “self” database entries 
  If process is not in “self” database{ 
   Status=PreventiveAction(processID, signature) 
   //log status 
  }//end if 
 }//end for 
 // after assurance that all processes in memory are “self” 
 while agentAge<criticalAge{ 
  Monitor all processes loaded in memory 
  If loaded process not self{ 
Run antivirus to scan if a known malware{ 
    if yes, terminate process and update log file 
    else status=PreventiveAction(processID, signature) 
    //log status 
  }//end if 
 }//end while 
}//end ActiveAgent 
string PreventiveAction(processID, signature){ 
 //Inform admin of process existence without interrupting its execution 
 cobegin 
  sandbox(processID) 
  begin{ 
print(Would you like to allow <process> to execute outside its 
sandbox? Y/N) 
read  reply 
if reply is yes{  
setSelf(processID, signature) 
return “self” 
} 
}end 
//use the anomaly detector to monitor the process behavior 
if process performs an anomaly 
status=alert(processID, signature) 
 coend 
 74 
if process terminates normally or due to the sandbox effect{ 
 //such as out of memory, no response from admin…etc. 
 Inform admin and owner of termination status 
 Update log files 
 }//end if 
 return status  
}//end PreventiveAction 
string alert(processID, signature){ 
 Interrupt process 
 Enforce firewall strict traffic policy 
 print(<process> performed anomaly, terminate it? Y/N) 
read  reply 
 Wait for predetermined period of time //admin defined, maybe zero 
 If no response || Yes{ 
  Terminate process 
Save process’ temporary storage into an un-executable temp file 
Save process’ virtual processing area parameters in temp file. 
Update AV and ID with process signature 
Update log file with actions taken 
status= “malware” 
 }//end if 
 else{//admin identifies process as self 
  setSelf(processID) 
  status= “self” 
 }//end else  
return status 
}//end alert 
setSelf(processID, signature){ 
 //use sandbox tools to redirect the process pointers to the real system components. 
Allow process to execute outside the sandbox 
//copy saved data to target files 
Commit changes made by the process to output devices 
//allow changes to memory and registers 
Commit changes made to the execution environment 
Add signature to “self” database 
}//end setSelf 
sandbox(processID){ 
//using sandbox tools 
 Create virtual processing area in memory (virtual memory and registers) 
 Create temporary storage area for process output 
 Execute process 
}//end sandbox 
string extractSignature(processID){ 
 Use signature extraction tool 
 return signature 
}//end extractSignature 
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Figure 8. Sandbox Technique Sequence. 
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c. Job 2 performed an anomaly, the agent updated the AV and ID signature database with 
Job 2 signature for future reference. 
 
 
d. Job 2 is terminated and all the changes it made are abandoned along with its virtual 
processing environment 
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